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MISSOURI SECTION
gested that this is an unfortunate step backward in view of the mod-
ern trend towards greater discovery, and the fact that one of the pur-
poses underlying this trend has been to equalize the opportunities of
large corporate defendants and less pecunious plaintiffs to obtain the
facts needed to present their respective cases.1 3
TORTS-NVRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS-PRENATAL INJURIES
Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953)
A car negligently operated by the defendant collided with the car
of a pregnant woman. The child was born alive but subsequently died
as a result of injuries allegedly sustained in the accident. Suit was
brought against the defendant under the Missouri "wrongful death"
statute., The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a cause
of action. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held that
since a child may maintain a suit for negligently caused injuries re-
ceived while viable and en ventre sa mere, under the statute the re-
presentatives of the child may recover where the injury results in
death?
Most courts do not allow recovery for the negligent injury of an
unborn child.;; In the leading case of Dietrich v. Inhabitants of North-
ampton4, Mr. Justice Holmes, denying recovery for prenatal injuries,
reasoned that the unborn child is part of the mother, that the mother
can recover for injuries not too remote, and that therefore the child
need not recover. Other reasons which have been advanced for the
denial of recovery are: that there is no person in existence to whom
a duty could be owed at the time of the accident ;, that to allow re-
covery would increase the probability of false claims ;( that there was
no common law right of action, and the right, if created, should arise
1,5. Martin v. Lingle Refrigeration Co., 260 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1953). This recent
case apparently cited the principal case as holding that the photographs were
exempt as a privileged communication.
1. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080 (1949):
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect
or default of another, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if
death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the
person who or the corporation which would have been liable if death had not
ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death
of the person injured. [Italics added.]
2. Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953).
;. RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 869 (1939): "A person who negligently causes harm
to an unborn child is not liable to such child for the harm." See 12 M. L. Ruv.
223, 224 (1951), for an enumeration of the few jurisdictions which allow recovery.
4. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
. PRoSSE8, ToRrs 188-190 (1941).
6. Bliss v. Passanesi, 95 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. 1950).
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from "legislative action ;" and that proof of causal connection is im-
possible.8
A minority of courts allow recovery for prenatal injuries.0 These
courts hold that because a viable"0 unborn child is capable of living
outside the uterus it is a person in esse.11 Recent cases have rejected
the argument that "legislative action" is necessary for recovery and
have allowed recovery without express statutory authorization ."2
These courts also necessarily hold that proof of the causal connection
of the defendant's negligence to the injury is possible."
There is disagreement among the courts allowing recovery as to
when a child is actually viable. The child has been considered as a
person by some courts only when it could be severed from the mother
and continue life absolutely separated from her.14 Other courts have
indulged in a legal fiction by which they have extended viability so
that a child is considered a person from the time of its conception."r
Where recovery is disallowed under the wrongful death statutes
the same reasons are given by the majority courts that they give in
denying recovery to the prenatally injured person. This holding is
logical, because the statute gives a cause of action only where the
deceased could have recovered if he had lived. Those courts which
allow recovery by the injured child, by calling the viable child a per-
7. Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v.
United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913) ; Stemmer v. Kline,
128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942); Ryan v, Public Service Co-
ordinated Transport, 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
8. Superior Transfer Co. v. Halstead, 189 Md. 536, 56 A.2d 706 (1948). For a
discussion of medical testimony see: Note, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 408; Meyer and
Cummins, Severe Maternal Trauma I Early Pregnancy; Congenital Anputa-
tions in the Infant at Term, 42 AM. JouR. OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 150, 153
(1941).
9. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPhceters, 83
Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939); Tucker v. Howard Carmichael and Sons,
Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S,E.2d 909 (1951); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. App.
1923) (opinion published in 1949); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550 (Md.
1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951): Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529,
92 N.E.2d 809 (1950).
10. Dorland, THE AmEmcAN ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 1616 (21st ed.
1948), defines viable as follows: "Viable. Capable of living; especially capable of
living outside the uterus: said of a fetus that has reached such a stage of develop-
ment that it can live outside the uterus."
11. Scott v. MePheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 630, 92 P.2d 678, 679 (1939);
Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352, 355 (La. App. 1923) (opinion published in 1949).
One court has said that a duty of due care is owed to the unborn child. Verkennes
v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
12. Tucker v. Howard Carmichael and Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909(1951) ; Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
13. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951). It has been ob-
served that the difficulty in cases involving prenatal injuries is no greater than
in many other matters of medical proof. PRossu , TORTS 188-190 (1941).
14. See, e.g., Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.
2d 334 (1949).




son, also allow recovery by the representatives under a wrongful
death statute."'
Only one case, Buel -P. United Rys. Co. of St. Louigs,17 had been de-
cided on prenatal injuries in Missouri prior to the principal case. In
that case suit was brought under the wrongful death statute,18 and
recovery was denied to the representative of a child whose death was
caused by injuries inflicted while in the mother's womb. The court
held that since an infant could not recover for prenatal injuries if
he himself were alive, the presence of the statute was no reason to
grant relief to the survivors. By expressly overruling the Btel case,
the court in the principal case joined the progressive minority of
courts. The court would allow recovery to a person prenatally injured
and therefore did allow recovery to the representatives of the child
where the injuries were fatal, under the "plain terms" of the wrong-
ful death statute.9
The trend of the recent cases is definitely toward allowing recovery
to persons injured before birth, and allowing recovery by the repre-
sentatives of such persons where the injury is fatal. Commendable
though the trend may be, until there is a definite determination of
when a child is viable, and more adequate proof as to the causal con-
nection, extreme caution should be exercised before allowing recovery.
\VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COMMON LAW ACTION AGAINST EM-
PLOYER FOR INJURY NOT COMPENSABLE UNDER THE ACT
MeDa'niel v. Kerr. 258 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. 1953)
Plaintiff developed an abscessed lung from exposure to plaster dust
in the course of employment. He brought an action against his em-
ployer to recover damages for injuries resulting from defendant's al-
leged breach of his common law duty to provide a safe place in which
to work and adequate protective devices. Both plaintiff and defendant
had accepted coverage of the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act
relating to injury by accident,' but not to occupational diseases.* The
trial court entered judgment for defendant notwithstanding the ver-
dict for plaintiff on the ground that the evidence showed as a matter
of law that plaintiff's injury was an accident within the meaning of
16. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949) ; Sasinsky v.
Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950) ; Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
17. 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913).
18. See note 1 supra.
19. Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Mo. 1953).
1. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.010 et seq. (1949).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.020 (4) (1949). The court did not decide whether plain-
tiff's injury was or was not an occupational disease, because the parties had not
accepted the occupational disease provision.
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